Nedumpara

Today, the Supreme Court and High Courts hear PILs concerning the public at large entirely behind their backs, which is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and the judgments so rendered cannot in law bind the public at large. If PILs are permissible at all, they can only take the form of representative proceedings. A declaration to that effect is sought in the instant Petition under Article 32.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2026
(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)

IN THE MATTER OF:
MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS. PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. RESPONDENTS

WITH

I.A. NO. OF 2026
APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAR AND ARGUE IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED WRIT PETITION FILED BEFORE THIS HON’BLE COURT AS PARTY IN PERSON

PAPER BOOK
(KINDLY SEE INDEX INSIDE)

MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA
PARTY-IN-PERSON NO. 1
MOB. NO. +91 9820535428

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
S.NO. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS PAGE NO.

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INDEX
S. No. Particulars of Documents Page No. of part to which it belongs Remarks
Part I
[Contents of Paper Book] Part-II
[Contents of file alone]

[i] [ii] [iii] [iv] [v]
E-Court Fee
1 Listing Performa A1-A3 A1-A3
2 Cover page of Paper Book A-4
3 Index of Record of Proceedings A-5
4 Defect List A-6
5 Note Sheet A-7
6 Synopsis & List of Dates B
7 Writ Petition with Affidavit 1-22
8 I.A. NO. OF 2026
Application for permission to appear and argue the above-mentioned Writ Petition filed before this Hon’ble Court as Party in Person.
23-26
9 ANNEXURE A-1
A true copy of the Aadhar Card bearing No. 2979 5739 1137 of the Petitioner in Person No. 1. 27
10 ANNEXURE A-2
A true copy of the Aadhar Card bearing No. 9377 16660 6859 of the Petitioner in Person No. 2. 28
11 ANNEXURE A-3
A true copy of the Aadhar Card bearing No. 8634 9836 9864 of the Petitioner in Person No. 3. 29
12 Memo of Appearances 30-32
13 F/M 33
14 Copy of the Bar Council ID of the Petition in Person. 34

Place: New Delhi
Dated: 24.09.2026
PROFORMA FOR FIRST LISTING
SECTION
The case pertains to (Please tick / check the correct box):

Central Act: (Title) Constitution of India

Section: Under Article 32 of Constitution of India

Central Rule: (Title) N.A.

Rule No(s) N.A.

State Act: (Title) N.A.

Section: N.A.

State Rule: (Title) N.A.

Rule No(s) N.A.

Impugned Interim Order: (Date) N.A.

Impugned Final Order / Decree: (Date) N.A.

High Court: (Name) N.A.

Names of Judges: N.A.

Tribunal / Authority: (Name) N.A.

  1. Nature of Matter
    Civil
    Criminal
  2. (a) Petitioner MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS.
    (b) E-Mail Id: mathewsjnedumpara@gmail.com (c) Mobile Phone Number: 9820535428
  3. (a) Respondent: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
    (b) E-Mail Id: N. A.
    (c) Mobile Phone Number: N. A.
  4. (a) Main Category Classification. 1800 Ordinary Civil Matters
    (b) Sub Classification: 1807 Others
  5. Not to be listed before: N.A.
  6. (a) Similar disposed of matter with citation, if any, & case details:
    No similar matter is disposed of by this Hon’ble Court.
    (b) Similar pending matter with case details:
    No similar matter is pending before this Hon’ble Court.
  7. Criminal Matters: Not Applicable
    (a) Whether accused / convict has surrendered: Yes No (b) FIR No. N.A. Date: N.A.
    (c) Police Station: N.A.
    (d) Sentence Awarded: N.A.
    (e) Period of sentence undergone including period of detention / custody undergone: NA.
    (f) Whether any earlier case between the same parties is filed: N.A.
    (g) Particulars of the FIR and Case: N.A.
    (h) Whether any bail application was preferred earlier and decision thereupon: N.A.
  8. Land Acquisition Matters:
    (a) Date of Section 4 Notification: N.A.
    (b) Date of Section 6 Notification: N.A.
    (c) Date of Section 17 Notification: N.A.
  9. Tax Matters: Sate the tax effect: N.A.
  10. Special Category (First Petitioner / Appellant Only):
    Senior Citizen > 65 Years SC / ST Woman /Child Disabled Legal Aid Case In Custody
  11. Vehicle Number (in case of Motor Accident Claim Matters): N.A.
  12. Whether there was is litigation on the same point of law, if yes, details thereof. No

Place: New Delhi
Dated: 14.10.2026
MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA
PETITIONER IN PERSON
Mob. No. 9820535428
E-Mail: mathewsjnedumpara@gmail.com

SYNOPSIS
The Petitioners are lawyers and citizens. The instant petition is instituted by invoking Article 32 of the Constitution of India in light of the extraordinary and calamitous situation prevailing in the country.
The Petitioners are constrained to institute a petition under Article 32 as the instant one in an extraordinary situation where the concept of rule of law and separation of powers, the very constitutional democracy, is put to great jeopardy, that too by prominent lawyers of the Supreme Court by instituting PILs seeking the Court to act in substitution of the executive and legislature and to take upon to itself the governance, even the maintenance of law and order, unthinkable to say the least. In the last over 40 years, the concept of pro bono litigation intended to render justice to a person aggrieved, an undertrial, slumdwellers, tribals and the like, was grossly abused to run the government, in substitution of the executive and the legislature, putting the concept of constitutional democracy and separation of powers to great jeopardy.
The time has come to put a stop to the grossest of abuse of the jurisdiction under Article 32 which is meant only for the enforcement of fundamental rights involving an actual person aggrieved based on facts and evidence which are justiciable. In a sense, the instant petition is to counter the menace of PIL.

Hence the instant Writ Petition.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2026
(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)

IN THE MATTER OF:

  1. MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA
    ADVOCATE, 101, 1ST FLOOR,
    GUNDECHA CHAMBER, NAGINDAS ROAD,
    FORT, MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA-400001. PETITIONER NO. 1
  2. ROHINI AMIN, ADVOCATE,

B- 705, NIRMAN APARTMENTS,
RJ MARG, PUMP HOUSE,
ANDHERI EAST, MUMBAI,
MAHARSHTRA-400049. PETITIONER NO. 2

  1. HEMALI SURESH KURNE, ADVOCATE,
    4TH FLOOR, 28 AWING,
    SHUBHSHAGUN COMPLEX,
    RISHIKESH CO-OP HSG, SECTOR-34,
    MANSAROVAR, NAVI MUMBAI,
    MAHARASHTRA. PETITIONER NO. 4
    VERSUS
  2. UNION OF INDIA,
    REPRESENTED BY THE CABINET SECRETARY,
    GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
    SEVA TEERTH,
    NEW DELHI-110001. RESPONDENT NO. 1
  3. BHARATIYA JANATHA PARTY
    REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL,
    6-A, DEEN DAYAL UPADHYAYA MARG,

    NEW DELHI-110002. RESPONDENT NO. 2
  4. INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS
    REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL
    INDIRA BHAWAN, 9A, KOTLA MARG,
    NEW DELHI-110002. RESPONDENT NO. 3
  5. COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (M)

REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL
A.K GOPALAN BHAWAN,
27-29, BHAI VIR SINGH MARG,
NEW DELHI-110001. RESPONDENT NO. 4

WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
TO
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF INDIA AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OFINDIA
HUMBLE PETITION OF THE
PETITIONERS IN PERSONS ABOVE NAMED
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH:

  1. That the Petitioners are lawyers and citizens. The instant petition is instituted by invoking Article 32 of the Constitution of India in light of the extraordinary and calamitous situation prevailing in the country.
  2. To bind individuals who are not parties before a court to an adverse decision violates the core principles of natural justice. Non-parties have no opportunity to participate in litigation, adduce evidence, rebut opposing evidence, or present arguments. Therefore, it is a fundamental principle of law that no one is bound by a judgment to which they were not a party—a concept encapsulated in the maxim res inter alios iudicata aliis neque nocet neque prodest.
  3. While third parties can never be adversely affected by a judgment rendered in a proceeding to which they were not a party, they may, in certain instances, take advantage of it. Examples include a decree of divorce (which alters the legal status of the parties) or judgments concerning property rights, insolvency, and bankruptcy. All of these are considered judgments in rem. Thus, third parties may benefit from judgments that are declaratory regarding legal status or property titles. However, to reiterate: no court possesses the authority to issue a judgment that adversely binds individuals who are not before it. To permit this violates the fundamental principles of jurisprudence and natural justice.
  4. When Parliament enacts a law, all of us, we, the citizens are symbolically present, and it is with our consent that a law is enacted. The record of the Parliament, therefore, binds everyone because we are all parties to the proceedings. It is we who enact the laws through our representatives; we are symbolically present in Parliament.
  5. On the contrary, the record of a court binds only the parties before it. A judgment of a court in a case between A and B will bind only A and B, because no court has the power to bind those who are not parties before it. Conversely, a court has full authority to bind the parties before it, even through an erroneous decision, howsoever incorrect it may be. The parties who suffer as a result of an erroneous judicial decision have no choice but to bear the outcome unless the law provides a mechanism for correction, such as a review, appeal, revision, or any other remedy recognized by law.
  6. The parties to a litigation are bound by the decision of the court—howsoever unjust or incorrect it may be—under the doctrine of res judicata. Once a court arrives at a conclusion on facts, then no matter how incorrect it may be or how great the injustice, the parties before the court remain bound by that judgment. If a court holds an innocent man guilty of murder and sentences him to death, and that decision is upheld by the final court of appeal, the innocent man will be executed. In short, erroneous decisions are as binding as correct ones.
  7. Our legal system is founded on the principle that courts, being composed of fallible human beings, can make errors—even grave ones. However, the rule of finality and the principle that no person shall be vexed for the same cause more than once make it mandatory that the parties before a court be bound by its decision.
  8. As a corollary, no person who is not a party before a court can be adversely affected by a judgment in a proceeding to which they were not a party. There is only one exception: judgments in rem. However, that exception does not mean that C and D, who were not parties to a case between A and B, can be adversely affected by a court’s decision in that case. It merely means that third parties can take advantage of a judgment that falls within the realm of a judgment in rem.
  9. For instance, in a suit between a husband and wife where a decree of divorce is granted, the judgment is a judgment in rem. Where the divorce is rejected, the judgment is in personam. A judgment in rem, loosely translated, operates against the whole world. Therefore, the legal status of the husband and wife is altered once a divorce is granted, allowing third parties to enter into a valid marriage with either spouse whose marital status has been changed.
  10. Regrettably, citizens today are frequently forced to face scenarios where—often like a bolt from the blue—judgments severely impacting their rights, liberties, and property are delivered by High Courts and even the Supreme Court in proceedings to which they were never made parties.
  11. A classic example is the case of slum dwellers in Mumbai. The Bombay High Court entertained numerous petitions filed by organizations such as the Bombay Environmental Action Group and Janhit Manch, seeking judicial directions for the removal of alleged illegal encroachments. Nearly 60% of Mumbai’s population resides in slums, with a vast majority occupying public or private land. Demolishing all these structures meant rendering 60% of the city’s population homeless.
  12. Recognizing that low-income citizens were forced to construct shanties on vacant land due to a severe shortage of housing stock, the Maharashtra legislature had enacted the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act. Restrictive tenancy laws had made rental housing construction economically unviable, and the government failed to provide adequate housing, leaving poorer citizens with no alternative but to build temporary shelters on public land. Although the Slum Act aimed to eradicate slums and offer structured rehabilitation, its schemes did not progress as efficiently as anticipated. Nonetheless, it provided a statutory framework for rehabilitation.
  13. Despite this, in 1995, the Bombay High Court ordered the demolition of nearly 400,000 homes in the Sanjay Gandhi National Park area, acting upon a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed by the Bombay Environmental Action Group. These orders were passed without issuing notice to the affected slum dwellers and without granting them a hearing—entirely behind their backs. Later, in 2004, the High Court issued further directions to remove illegal structures, effectively mandating the eviction of millions of residents. The court even established monitoring committees to enforce its directions—again without serving notice to or hearing a single affected slum dweller.
  14. This resulted in thousands of families being rendered homeless. As Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer observed in his book, Off the Bench, the political executive remained silent and executed the court’s directives despite knowing they were unjust, simply because they felt bound to enforce a judicial mandate.
  15. There are a number of instances where courts, acting on Public Interest Litigations (PILs), have passed orders contrary to the interests of citizens at large who were not even parties before them.
  16. A classic example is the case of the Sabarimala Lord Ayyappa temple. A petition—a so-called PIL—was instituted in the Supreme Court claiming violation of Article 14, challenging the restriction on the entry of women of reproductive age into the temple on the ground that Lord Ayyappa is a Naishtika Brahmachari (eternal celibate).
  17. Whether there is any scientific basis for this restriction is irrelevant; it is a matter of faith, and faith is non-justiciable. It is the belief of the women devotees of Lord Ayyappa themselves that the deity does not welcome women of a particular age group visiting him, and they respect that faith. In accordance with this religious belief, the government had framed a rule—a piece of subordinate legislation—regulating and prohibiting the entry of women devotees of menstrual age.
  18. Had devotees of Lord Ayyappa objected to that rule and claimed it violated their fundamental rights, there would have been a genuine cause of action and an aggrieved party, making the issue justiciable. If a certain percentage of women devotees believed the restriction was the divine order of Lord Ayyappa, while another segment believed no such prohibition existed and that it was merely man-made, a lis (legal dispute) would exist. In that scenario, the court might have had jurisdiction to decide the matter.
  19. Even if the courts had jurisdiction, such an issue could only be decided through representative proceedings—where two or more aggrieved persons invoke the jurisdiction of a court on an issue concerning themselves and others similarly situated, akin to class-action litigation (which Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for).
  20. However, not a single devotee of Lord Ayyappa felt that the rules were violative of their right to faith or Article 14. Instead, the Young Lawyers Association, Delhi—whose members did not claim to be devotees—filed a petition stating they had come to know of an “unjustifiable practice.” The Supreme Court entertained the petition and declared the rule unconstitutional.
  21. This outcome brought thousands of women devotees of Lord Ayyappa onto the streets. Consequently, the Supreme Court had to constitute a nine-judge bench to hear the review matter over 19 days, necessitating the suspension of as many as five regular benches for days on end—all at the cost of ordinary litigants whose cases hardly receive even a minute of the court’s time.
  22. The question is: If it is beyond dispute that only an aggrieved person can approach a court to seek remedies, and that the law provides no remedy unless there is an infringement of a legal right, then how did Public Interest Litigation (PIL) come into existence—where someone can approach a court even when none of their own rights have been infringed?
  23. The answer to this question is not simple at all. Before the Kesavananda Bharati case, if one were to approach the Supreme Court by invoking Article 32, one had to plead the infringement of fundamental rights. Without such a pleading, no petition under Article 32 would lie. However, after the Kesavananda Bharati case, so-called PIL petitioners started coming to the Supreme Court pleading that although none of their personal rights were infringed and they were not “persons aggrieved” at all, the basic structure of the Constitution had been infringed.
  24. Now, the courts are duty-bound to ask such a litigant: “If none of your personal rights are infringed, but only the basic structure, how does it matter if that basic structure is infringed—nay, completely reduced to rubble and dust? And if your actual grievance is that your rights are infringed, why don’t you plead that specific right is infringed instead of pleading that the basic structure is infringed?”
  25. The basic structure doctrine, rendered by a full bench of the Supreme Court after hearing the matter for months, was revered as containing the unamendable, transcendental, and primordial basic features of the Constitution, which Parliament—even in its constituent power—cannot abrogate or violate. No court would ever ask a litigant coming before it: “If none of your individual rights are infringed, why does it matter if the basic structure is violated?
  26. The fundamental principle of law that no person can approach a court unless he is an aggrieved person whose legal or fundamental rights are infringed came to be erased by the basic structure theory, which led to a new proposition: a person can invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 or the High Court under Article 226 without complaining of any violation of his legal or fundamental rights, but on the sole ground that the basic structure is infringed.
  27. In the post-Emergency period, the Supreme Court was severely criticized for failing to come to the aid of citizens whose fundamental rights were infringe, most notably, in the judgment of the ADM Jabalpur case.
  28. This criticism led the Supreme Court to entertain petitions on behalf of the underprivileged filed by individuals acting pro bono, as seen in cases such as the Bhagalpur blinded prisoners case. The Court dispensed with strict procedural rules requiring the aggrieved person to personally approach the court.
  29. In doing so, the Court did not invent a entirely new jurisprudence; rather, it relaxed procedural requirements regarding locus standi. In pro bono litigations instituted for the enforcement of the rights of disadvantaged individuals—such as incarcerated undertrials who cannot access the court due to poverty, illiteracy, or detention—a person acting bona fide is permitted to act as an agent on their behalf to seek relief before the Supreme Court or High Courts. In such scenarios, the true petitioner remains the aggrieved individual in custody, not the representative who filed the petition on their behalf. Therefore, these pro bono litigations are fully constitutional and maintain the fundamental legal principle that relief is sought for the aggrieved person. This approach aligns seamlessly with the legal doctrine ubi jus ibi remedium—where there is a right, the law will provide a remedy and a forum.
  30. The Supreme Court, through pro bono litigation, opened its doors to the weaker sections—the most deprived among the deprived. It was such a noble endeavor. Consequently, pro bono litigation, often referred to as Public Interest Litigation (PIL), became very popular. It came to be seen as a benevolent, progressive, people-friendly, and invaluable instrument for rendering actual justice to those who need it the most.
  31. Certain individuals and organizations have completely assumed for themselves the role of the Attorney General, who is the sole custodian of the public interest. They institute petitions as if they themselves were the Attorney General, representing the public at large. Decisions with far-reaching ramifications concerning the general public are then taken without notice to them and without hearing them, with the court acting in substitution of the legislature and the executive.
  32. How this benevolent jurisprudence, which came to be appreciated not only in India, but far beyond our borders, became a subject of great abuse driven by questionable private motives. Individuals and even so-called organizations or NGOs started filing petitions in the Supreme Court and various High Courts. In those petitions, what they sought was not relief for an undertrial, a slum dweller, or anyone who, due to poverty, incarceration, or illiteracy, was unable to approach the court. Instead, they sought the court’s intervention in matters of executive and legislative policy and governance.
  33. The courts, the Petitioners are pained to say, without fully recognizing the far-reaching ramifications—how counterproductive Public Interest Litigation (PIL) could be, and how it could turn into an instrument of injustice—entertained many such petitions. Consequently, hundreds of orders were passed in matters concerning the public at large entirely behind their backs, without any notice to the public or an opportunity for them to participate in these proceedings.
  34. No man-made institution can be perfect. The doctrine of res judicata is a recognition of that undeniable fact. The import of the doctrine of res judicata is that if a judgment is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the court has observed the principles of natural justice and adjudicated the matter on its merits, that judgment, howsoever erroneous it may be, is binding between the parties, provided the court has not acted contrary to settled principles of law or express statutory provisions. Thus, a judicial decision, even if patently wrong, is final and binding.
  35. Just as the judiciary is free to err within its domain, the executive is also free to err, but with a key distinction: a judicial error cannot be corrected, regardless of the gravity of the injustice, except through the specific procedures provided by law. Conversely, an error on the part of the executive or the legislature is amenable to public and legal correction. Therefore, in a democratic country, the freedom of speech and expression and the right to protest are fundamental, and the very essence of democracy is the right to dissent.
  36. Where the government has failed to act according to the expectations of the people, acted contrary to settled ethical principles of governance, or indulged in corruption and malpractice, there are mechanisms known to law. This does not always mean resorting to a Public Interest Litigation (PIL)—if a person in power has committed a criminal offense, criminal law can be set in motion. If the government has erred in governance and failed to discharge its obligations to the public at large, democratic means exist for correction, up to and including removing the government. Good people should enter politics. The government must be criticized and opposed for its wrong decisions, and no authority can deny that freedom, as it is the very ethos of our Constitution.
  37. The right to dissent, the right to form associations, and the right to protest are undeniable constitutional rights. No government can restrain or deny those rights. However, claiming that issues of governance can be brought before a court to ask it to decide on matters of governance, law and order, executive policy, and legislative policy —even where there is a manifest failure or deficiency in governance, assuming that to be so— is unconstitutional. Because the concept of separation of powers excludes the jurisdiction of the Court in matters of governance. Merely because the Government may be manifestly wrong in the eyes of a large section of the people, or the eyes of the judge, the issue does not become justiciable. Otherwise, where the government considers the decision of a court to be patently wrong, it can assert so and refuse to give effect to the same. Judicial decisions are binding even where it is manifestly wrong because on disputed questions of fact the court is free to err and bind the parties. As a constitutional principle, the legislature can undo a judicial decision even retrospectively. That the legislature is supreme, is the foundation of common law. By virtue of Article 372(2), common law has been adopted as the law of the land.
  38. The question here is not whether the executive/legislature or the judiciary is supreme. The Legislature is supreme in its province, so too the judiciary. The executive, however, is accountable to the legislature for everything it does, at every moment, because in a Parliamentary democracy, the very existence of the political executive is dependent on the confidence of the legislature. To rush to the Supreme Court seeking its interference in matters which fall in the exclusive province of the executive and legislature, that too by a lobby of lawyers, who many believe have hijacked the institution, is a threat to democracy and the very judiciary itself. Those who clamour for “judicial supremacy” are not doing any service to the institution of judiciary. They only seek to self-serve their vested interest. When everything under the sun, matters falling in the exclusive province of the legislature and executive is justiciable, that too by way of PILs which are conducted as a private litigation, what is in jeopardy is public interest, and what is subserved is the vested interest of the lobbies.
  39. The Petitioners do not at all subscribe to the view the government or the Chief Election Commissioner is not at fault. The Election Commissioner, like Caesar’s wife, ought to be above suspicion. And where his impartiality and integrity is questioned by a large section of the population, as in the instant case, they certainly have a right to demand his resignation. Under Article 324(5) of the Constitution, the Chief Election Commissioner could be impeached but no petition seeking his removal will lie. Such petitions are an appeal to this Court to trench into the domain of the Parliament which alone is competent to impeach an Election Commissioner. If a plea for removal of the Chief Election Commissioner will lie before this court under Article 32 then it will be difficult to reject a plea for the removal of a judge of the High Court/Supreme Court invoking Article 32.
  40. Elections not only ought to be free and fair, it ought to be seen to be so. it is absolutely paramount and uncompromisable. Electronic voting system may have great advantages, nothing wrong in embracing technology, but there is a growing demand for paper ballot. And the Petitioners believe that the same is justified. However, it is not a justiciable issue. It remains in the domain of executive/legislative policy. Article 32 cannot be a panacea for all the evils which our democracy is facing today.
  41. The Collegium system was introduced through Article 32, judicial legislation. However, everyone, almost without exception, considers that he collegium system to be a grave error. The answer to many an evil which our constitutional democracy faces today, to quote Plato, is that good men/women shall join politics, lest they should be ruled by less deserving.
  42. In political matters concerning the public at large, public opinion is always divided. A substantial portion of the population may support a plea for the removal of the Chief Election Commissioner, demand the resignation of the Prime Minister, or consider the government guilty of autocracy and argue that it should be replaced. The general public and opposition parties have every right to make those demands. Similarly, an equal section of society may support the government. They consider that there is no election rigging or autocracy, that the allegations lack legal and factual foundations, and that the government is right. These sections of society also have a right to be heard.
  43. If the court is called upon to decide such issues, it must listen to both the voice of dissent and opposing viewpoints. However, it is simply not possible for the court to hear the public at large—both those who support the government and those who oppose it, or those who contend that an Election Commissioner should be removed and those who believe they should not. Therefore, these issues are not justiciable. The court has no jurisdiction at all. If the court were to have jurisdiction, it would mean it must hear everyone concerned, which could only occur through representative proceedings. Yet, representative proceedings also have limitations. Pure matters of governance, legislative policy, and executive policy—where every citizen of this country has a stake and a right to express an opinion—cannot be conducted through representative proceedings.
  44. Today, when a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is entertained, only a powerful few are heard. The court hears the views of a few lawyers, acting either on behalf of a political party or on their own. While celebrated advocate petitioners and others have every right to criticize the government or the court, or lead a procession to the Supreme Court—all of which is constitutional and permissible—the limitation remains that these issues cannot be heard and decided by the court because there is a counter-view.
  45. The entire population of the country does not support the viewpoint of the opposition parties or the petitioners who appear before the court. There is an equal number of people who oppose that view and support the government. The court cannot take a decision without hearing the people who support the government and oppose what is pleaded by the opposition. To hear only a few lawyers because of their prominence in society and the profession would be to make a mockery of democracy.
  46. The Petitioner has not filed any other Petition in this court covering the same cause of action.
  47. The Petitioner states that the Petitioner shall rely upon documents a list whereof is annexed hereto.
  48. That the Petitioner craves leave to add, amend or alter any of the foregoing grounds with the permission of this Court.
    GROUNDS
    The averments in the statement of facts be treated as forming part of the grounds.
    A. The Petitioners are constrained to institute a petition under Article 32 as the instant one in an extraordinary situation where the concept of rule of law and separation of powers, the very constitutional democracy, is put to great jeopardy, that too by prominent lawyers of the Supreme Court by instituting PILs seeking the Court to act in substitution of the executive and legislature and to take upon to itself the governance, even the maintenance of law and order, unthinkable to say the least. In the last over 40 years, the concept of pro bono litigation intended to render justice to a person aggrieved, an undertrial, slumdwellers, tribals and the like, was grossly abused to run the government, in substitution of the executive and the legislature, putting the concept of constitutional democracy and separation of powers to great jeopardy. The time has come to put a stop to the grossest of abuse of the jurisdiction under Article 32 which is meant only for the enforcement of fundamental rights involving an actual person aggrieved based on facts and evidence which are justiciable. In a sense, the instant petition is to counter the menace of PIL.
    PRAYER
    a) To declare that the proposition that an order or judgment of this Hon’ble Court, and in particular those under Article 142 of the Constitution, is binding on all is absolutely flawed, inasmuch as, when Parliament enacts a law, all citizens of this country are symbolically present, and it is with their consent that the law is enacted; thus, laws enacted by Parliament is binding on all, on the contrary, when this Hon’ble Court passes an order or renders a judgment in a matter concerning the public at large, it does not bind anyone other than the parties before it, inasmuch as it is a fundamental principle of law that nobody is bound by a judgment to which they are not a party, therefore, all orders rendered by this Hon’ble Court in so-called PILs (Public Interest Litigations) are void ab initio, stillborn and never existed in the eyes of the law; and
    b) To declare that, even assuming, for argument’s sake and without conceding in the least, that public interest litigations—conducted without notice to the public at large or affording it an opportunity to present its cause—nay, judgments rendered behind its back, are binding on the public at large, and that a violation of such orders would even amount to contempt of court, it is obligatory that PILs are conducted as representative proceedings, with notice to the public at large and an opportunity to the public at large to partake in the proceedings, support or oppose the same, adduce evidence, and contradict evidence that runs counter to their point of view, following a procedure akin to that under Section 91 read with Order I, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, lest PILs become instruments of injustice and tyranny, undemocratic and violative of the doctrine of audi alteram partem; and

c) To declare that the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court and, for that matter, any court or tribunal is confined to what is known in jurisprudence as a lis, namely, the assertion of a right by one party and its denial by another, requiring the court to allow the parties to adduce evidence in support of their conflicting causes in order to reach a final adjudication on facts and law that is binding on the parties; that matters of governance, law and order do not fall within the concept of a lis and are undeniably non-justiciable; and therefore that bringing such issues or matters of policy—which fall within the exclusive domain of the Executive and the Legislature—before this Hon’ble Court constitutes a gross abuse of the process of the court, leading to a scenario where the Court renders judgments and orders that it is not empowered by law to pass, worse still, which cannot be enforced, thereby undermining the authority of this Hon’ble Court; and
d) Pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interests of justice.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINIDNESS THE PETITIONER IN PERSON SHALL AS IN DUTY BOUND EVER PRAY.
Drawn & Filed by:

MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA
PARTY-IN-PERSON
MOB. 9820535428
Drawn on: 14.10.2026
Place: New Delhi
Dated: 14.10.2026
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2026

IN THE MATTER OF:
MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS. PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. RESPONDENTS
AFFIDAVIT
I, Mathews J. Nedumpara, Aged about 68 Years, Advocate and Petitioner In Person No. 1 herein, Office at 101, 1st Floor, Gundecha Chambers, Nagindas Master Road, Fort, Mumbai, Maharashtra-400001, Presently at New Delhi, do hereby solemnly affirm and State as follows:

  1. I am the Petitioner in Person No. 1 in the above-mentioned Writ Petition, and as such I am well conversant with the facts of the case and thus competent to swear this affidavit on behalf of other Petitioner in Persons also.
  2. I say that the I have read and understood the contents of the Synopsis and List of Dates at Pages _____ to _____ and contents of Para _____ to _____ at Pages _____ to _____ of the Writ Petition and connected applications at Pages _____ to _____ and state that the facts mentioned therein are true to my knowledge and belief and information derived from the records of the case as per the legal advice received and believed by me. I say that the facts and circumstances stated in the Writ Petition and connected applications are true and correct.
  3. That the annexures filed along with this Writ Petition are true copies of their respective originals.
  4. I say that the averments of facts stated herein above are true to my knowledge and no part of it is false and nothing material has been concealed there from.

DEPONENT

VERIFICATION
I the above-named deponent affirms that the contents of Para 1 to 4 of this affidavit are true and correct to best of my knowledge and belief and no part of it is false and nothing material has been concealed there from.
Verified at New Delhi on this the 14th day of October, 2026.

DEPONENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
I.A. NO. OF 2026
IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2026

IN THE MATTER OF:
MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS. PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. RESPONDENTS

APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAR AND ARGUE IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED WRIT PETITION FILED BEFORE THIS HON’BLE COURT AS PARTY IN PERSON
TO
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF INDIA AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OFINDIA
HUMBLE PETITION OF THE
PETITIONERS IN PERSON ABOVE NAMED
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:

  1. That the Petitioners are lawyers and citizens. The instant petition is instituted by invoking Article 32 of the Constitution of India in light of the extraordinary and calamitous situation prevailing in the country. A true copy of the Aadhar Card bearing No. 2979 5739 1137 of the Petitioner in Person No. 1 is annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE A-1 (PAGES 27). A true copy of the Aadhar Card bearing No. 9377 16660 6859 of the Petitioner in Person No. 2 is annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE A-2 (PAGES 28). A true copy of the Aadhar Card bearing No. 8634 9836 9864 of the Petitioner in Person No. 3 is annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE A-3 (PAGES 29).
  2. That the Petitioners in Persons are trying to put forth all the facts, circumstances and observations in the form of this Writ Petition before this Hon’ble Court.
  3. That the present application is being made in the interest of justice and no prejudice shall be caused to any party if the present application is allowed.
  4. That in light of the above, the balance of convenience lies in favour of the Applicant.
    PRAYER
    It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:
    a) Allow the present Application and permit the Petitioner in Person for self to appear and argue the above-mentioned Writ Petition in Person before this Hon’ble Court; and
    b) Pass such other order or further orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
    AND FOR WHICH ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONER IN PERSON SHALL AS IN DUTY BOUND EVER PRAY.
    Filed by:

MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA
PETITIONER IN PERSON NO. 1
MOB. NO. 9820535428
Place: New Delhi
Dated: 14.10.2026
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
I.A. NO. OF 2026
IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2026

IN THE MATTER OF:
MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS. PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. RESPONDENTS
AFFIDAVIT
I, Mathews J. Nedumpara, Aged about 68 Years, Advocate and Petitioner In Person No. 1 herein, Office at 101, 1st Floor, Gundecha Chambers, Nagindas Master Road, Fort, Mumbai, Maharashtra-400001, Presently at New Delhi, do hereby solemnly affirm and State as follows:

  1. I am the Petitioner in Person No. 1 in the above-mentioned Writ Petition, and as such I am well conversant with the facts of the case and thus competent to swear this affidavit on behalf of other Petitioner in Persons also.
  2. I say that the I have read and understood the contents of the accompanying application and state that the facts mentioned therein are true to my knowledge and belief and information derived from the records of the case as per the legal advice received and believed by me. I say that the facts and circumstances stated in the accompanying application and connected applications are true and correct.
  3. That the annexures filed along with this accompanying application are true copies of their respective originals.
  4. I say that the averments of facts stated herein above are true to my knowledge and no part of it is false and nothing material has been concealed there from.

DEPONENT

VERIFICATION
I the above-named deponent affirms that the contents of Para 1 to 4 of this affidavit are true and correct to best of my knowledge and belief and no part of it is false and nothing material has been concealed there from.
Verified at New Delhi on this the 14th day of October, 2026.

DEPONENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2026
(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)

IN THE MATTER OF:
MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS. PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. RESPONDENTS

MEMO OF APPEARANCE
To,
The Registrar,
Supreme Court of India,
New Delhi.
Sir,
Please enter my appearance for the above-named Petitioner in Person No. 1 in the above-mentioned Writ Petition.
Yours faithfully

Mathews J. Nedumpara
Advocate
Petitioner in Person
101, 1st Floor, Gundecha, Chamber,
Nagindas Road,
Fort, Mumbai-400001,
Maharashtra
E-Mail: mathewsjnedumpara@gmail.com
Mob. No. 9820535428
Dated: 14.10.2026
Place: New Delhi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2026
(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)

IN THE MATTER OF:
MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS. PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. RESPONDENTS

MEMO OF APPEARANCE
To,
The Registrar,
Supreme Court of India,
New Delhi.
Sir,
Please enter my appearance for the above-named Petitioner in Person No. 2 in the above-mentioned Writ Petition.
Yours faithfully

ROHINI AMIN
Advocate
Petitioner in Person No. 2
B-705, Nirman Apartment,
R.J. Marg, Pump House,
Andheri East, Mumbai,
Maharashtra-400009
Dated: 14.10.2026
Place: New Delhi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2026
(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)

IN THE MATTER OF:
MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS. PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. RESPONDENTS

MEMO OF APPEARANCE
To,
The Registrar,
Supreme Court of India,
New Delhi.
Sir,
Please enter my appearance for the above-named Petitioner in Person No. 3 in the above-mentioned Writ Petition.
Yours faithfully

Hemali Suresh Kurne
Advocate
Petitioner in Person No. 3
4th Floor, 28-A Wing,
Subhashgun Complex,
Rishikesh Co-op. HSG, Sector-34,
Mansarovar, Navi Mumbai,
Maharashtra.
Dated: 14.10.2026
Place: New Delhi

SECTION
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2026

IN THE MATTER OF:
MATHEWS J. NEDUMPARA & ORS. PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. RESPONDENTS
INDEX
Sl. No. Description Copies C. Fee
1 Listing Proforma 1
2 Synopsis & List of Dates 1
3 Writ Petition with affidavit 1
4 Annexure P-1 to 1
5 I.A. NO. OF 2026
Application for permission to appear and argue the above-mentioned Writ Petition filed before this Hon’ble Court as party in Person with affidavit. 1
6 Annexure A-1 to A-3 1
7 Memo of Appearances 1
Total 7
Filed by:

Mathews J. Nedumpara
Petitioner In Person
101, 1st Floor, Gundecha Chambers, Nagindas Master Road, Fort, Mumbai-400001, Maharashtra
Mob. No. 9820535428
E-Mail: mathewsjnedumpara@gmail.com
Dated: 14.10.2026
Place: New Delhi

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